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Two conceptual approaches to the mind-body problem have
been prevalent throughout history. One view sees man as split
into two or more divisions, while the other sees man as a basic
unity. The present article will give consideration to these differing
views and their implications for a Christian philosophy of man.
Also, arguments for a thorough-going monistic view of man will
be presented.

1. Dualism Versus Monism:The Mind-Body Problem
The dualistic view sees man as composed of mind and body-the
mental and the physical (in ancient anthropological terms, "soul
and body" or "spirit and body"). This "ghost-in-the-machine"
model has a long history, dating from Plato and other early Greek
philosophers. In modern times, the outstanding success of the
field of medicine in conquering disease has reinforced a kind of
"mind-plus-plumbing'?conception of man. Although the mind and
the plumbing are thought to interact, there seems to be an
implicit belief that man is composed of psyche and soma, as the
term "psychosomatic medicine7' suggests.
In its strongest form, dualism suggests that man is mind and
body. In a somewhat weaker, but more subtle form, it implies
that mental events are correlated with physical events, or that the
mind influences the body. But to speak of correlation is to imply
that there are two factors or two entities involved, for one cannot
correlate something with itself. It is precisely this kind of interactional or correlational dualism which is probably adhered to by
many Christians who reject the more direct and overt theory
of mind-body dualism.

280

JOHN M. BERECZ

The monistic model rejects any splitting of man into parts and
views him as a unified organism of great complexity and varied
functioning. This view rejects the notion that he is composed of
a mind and a body which interact ( a weak form of dualism),
but rather emphasizes man's absolutely basic unity. To use an
analogy from modern physics, we know that a flash of lightning
is an electrical discharge. There are not two things, the flash and
the discharge. There is just one thing; the flash is the electrical
discharge. These are but two different ways of characterizing the
same event. Similarly, according to the monistic theory, there do
not exist mental events which are correlated with physiological
events; rather, a "mental" event is also a "physiological" event.
The terminology simply represents two ways of characterizing the
selfsame event.
The monistic view of man as a complex but unified person
reflects Aristotle's revolt against Plato's dualism. More importantly, however, antedating these Greek philosophers, the ancient
Sumerians and Egyptians had a unitary view of man. To the
Egyptians, immortality was unthinkable without a body. Similarly,
OT Hebrew thought was not dualistic in any Platonic sense.'
Interestingly, although some Christians today have a clearlyarticulated monistic philosophy for discussing the state of the
dead, when they begin to consider man as a living functioning
organism they often lapse into a kind of dualism where man is
seen to be composed of mind and body. In this essay, I first
survey some of the common causes for "compartmentalization of
man," indicating that the philosophical bases for dualism are
questionable. Then I cite modern research, which raises further
doubts about the validity of a "mind-body" split. And finally, I
call attention to the fact that the model of man presented in the
NT is monistic, and endeavor to set forth some theological implications of a monistic philosophy in contrast to a dualistic one.
J. E. Royce, "Does Person or Self Imply Dualism?," American Psychologist
28 (1973): 883-891.
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2. Common Causes for the Compartmentalization of Man

The basic unity of man, which is the major premise of the
monistic model, is often overlooked simply because of the fact
that man is a complex being, possible to view from various perspectives. Further, the common every-day ways of talking about
man-with references to both his subjective feelings and his observable behavior-tend to imply some sort of basic division.
Additionally, various theological and philosophical writers describe man by using terminology such as "body and mind," or
"body and soul," or even "body, mind, and soul." In advocating
the monistic model, I am suggesting that all of these various
divisions, compartments, and fractions are apparent, not real, and
that there are no compelling grounds for believing in any substantive divisions within man.
Let us now look more closely at some of the reasons which
lead us to compartmentalize, fractionize, and divide man. First
of all, the complexity of man allows for many descriptions-each
unique, incomplete, and not reducible to the terms of another
system. If one were making a speech, for example, a biochemist
could write chemical equations describing changes taking place
in the muscles controlling the vocal cords, a neurologist with the
aid of an electroencephalograph could record electrical activity
at the cortex, a speech analyst could observe variations in the
speaking, and a journalist could comment on the literary quality
of the production. Each specialist would have his own unique
view and his own particular 'bag of tools," but all would be
describing the same unified person. It is only our study of man
that is broken down into separate fields; man himself functions
as a unified whole.
Unfortunately, some scholars have succumbed to the "nothingbutism" syndrome, fervently proclaiming that their particular
logical system and vocabulary is the only relevant way to analyze
man. Thus, man has variously been proclaimed to be nothing
but a product of conditioning2 nothing but a vast and complex
"Cf. B. F. Skinner, Beyond Freedom and Dignity (New York, 1971).
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series of chemical reactions, nothing but a naked ape. Humanists
and theologians have reacted by saying that man is more than
chemicals, more than a product of conditioning, more than an
animal. When confronted with how he is more than chemicals,
etc., they have presented physical scientists with an entirely different language and system of logic, and very little real communication has occurred.
The solution to this communication barrier seems to reside in
understanding that physical scientists and theologians have differing but complementary systems. An introspective mentalistic,
spiritual, or ethical description of a human activity does not
rival, but rather enhances, a description in physical terms. It is
an illustration of the complexity of man that he can be simultaneously described as a rational being, a moral agent, and a
living biological organism. These apparently opposing descriptions are a result of how we choose to analyze man, but they in
no way reflect any substantive divisions. Confusion results when
the vocabulary of the theologian, for example, is mixed with that
of the physical scientist.
Another factor which contributes to a compartmentalized view
of man is the fact that he is both a doer and an observer. He
experiences in a personal, subjective way what others observe in
him from a distance. This has resulted in the development of two
languages-the experiential language of the doer and the
descriptive language of the observer. Writers, philosophers, and
theologians often focus on man's subjective experiences, speaking
of thoughts, will power, motives, decisions, etc. They use metaphors, analogies, and mentalistic constructs. The term "mind," for
example, is a broad metaphor, subsuming a large number of
mentalistic constructs. In contrast, physical scientists, psychologists, and others interested in an objective description of
observable behavior have eschewed terms like "mind"; they use,
instead, such terms as "brain," "central nervous system," and the
like, to describe the organism and its interactions with the
environment.
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It is confusing to mix the logic and vocabularies of the subjective and objective frames of reference. The language of introspective reports is different from the language of material
processes, and follows a different logic. "Mind is a word which
belongs to a different logical vocabulary than "brain." There is
no problem in using the metaphorical language involving terms
such as "mind," as long as we recognize that we are using abstractions. Often, however, we attribute concreteness and reality
to these mentalistic constructs, treating them as if they exist in
a material sense. We should either talk about the brain, nervous
system, etc., and how these relate to other aspects of the organism,
or we should use the internal metaphorical language of mind,
thoughts, decisions, and the like; but to mix the language of
these two systems produces confusion.
Regardless of which system we are using, it should be clear
that we are talking about a single unified organism. Because of
these dual language systems, it is easy to subscribe to the dualistic
view of man, but such a division is simply a peculiarity deriving
from our language usage, and does not reflect any substantive
division.
In summary, then, although man is complex and although
we tend to view him from a number of perspectives, the "divisions" merely represent ways of talking about man, and the
fractionization is only apparent, not real. Further, our use of
subjective and objective language systems seems to imply that
man is a dualistic creature with an inner life and an external
body; but again, such a split is simply an illusion created by our
usage of language. In reality, man is a unified whole.

3. Recent Experimental Findings
The "ghost-in-the-machine" view of man has further been
perpetuated by the fact that we have almost no vocabulary with
which to describe our internal processes. Our language simply
lacks words to describe clearly how the "insides" of our bodies
feel. Moreover, inasmuch as in the past there have been few ways
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to observe such internal activities and even fewer ways to control them, most people have not been overly disturbed by the lack
of a precise vocabulary; and thus they have settled for a more
metaphoric and subjective language-all this seemingly adding
support to the dualistic notion of a kind of mystical, subjective,
inner "ghost" within men.
Recently, however, the use of biofeedback techniques has
tended to alter this s i t ~ a t i o n .It~ has now become possible for
persons visually to observe their own heart rate, blood pre~sure,~
or even the electrical activity of their brain^.^ Using this technology, it has become possible to train people to control these
activities within certain limits. Much of this research has been
carried on by Russian psychologists, who have for some time
been interested in developing control over internal activities. In
this country, psychologist Neal Miller and his associates have
been able to train rats to control contractions of their stomachs,
the volume of blood in their ears, and even urine formation in
their kidneys6 Other researchers have used biofeedback methods
to demonstrate that a human can learn to control his sweat-gland
activity, blood pressure, heart rate, and various other processes
formerly thought to be involuntary. A Russian psychologist described a person who could alter his heart rate over a range of
forty beats per minute merely by visualizing himself as asleep or
as vigorously active. This same person could elevate the skin
temperature of his right hand by imagining it was on a hot stove
while simultaneously lowering the temperature of his left hand
by imagining he was holding an ice cube.7 Although such draM. Karlins and L. Andrews, Biofeedback: Turning on the Power o f Your
Mind (Philadelphia, 1972).
'D. Shapiro, "Effects of Feedback and Reinforcement on the Control of
Human Systolic Blood Pressure," Science 163 (1969): 588-590.
J. Kamiya, "Conscious Control of Brainwaves," Readings in Psychology
Today (DeI Mar, California, 1972).
Neal E. Miller, "Learning of Visceral and Glandular Responses," Science
I63 (1969): 434-445.
P. J. Lang, "Automatic Control," Readings in Psychology Today (Del Mar,
California, 1972).
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matic changes have not been obtained with most subjects, it has
been clearly demonstrated that internal processes are not mystical
and uncontrollable events.
Although philosophical issues are never settled by scientific
experiments, recent evidence is certainly consistent with a
monistic view of man. It does not surprise the monistic theorist
to discover that man can control the electrical activity of his
brain. This is simply another way of saying that he can control
his thoughts. There are not two things-electrical activity and
thoughts-; rather, these represent but two ways of looking at
the same event.
As new research evidence accumulates, man emerges more
and more as a total, unified organism, and the concept of a
"ghost7' within the "machine" is less tenable; there seems to be
no substantive split between mind and body, and the distinction
between thinking and doing appears to be artificial. In reality,
thinking is doing. For example, in my own research, designed to
help people stop smoking, I have found this to be true. 1f-two
matched groups of smokers are given different treatmentssubjects of one group actually puffing on a cigarette while
receiving a mild electric shock, and subjects in another comparable group imagining smoking while receiving the shock-,
superior results occur with persons in the group that imagines
smoking.8 To the addicted smoker, imagining smoking is in
some respects more "real" than actually smoking. Conceivably,
he could smoke a cigarette "absent mindedly7' (that is, without
thinking about it) ; but when he vividly imagines engaging in
such behavior, it becomes very real.
We may conclude that a monistic view of man seems most
consistent with current philosophical and scientific thinking.

4. Theological Implications of a Monistic Philosophy
As must be implicit in the previous remarks, I object to the
J. M. Berecz, "Modification of Smoking Behavior through Self-administered
Punishment of Imagined Behavior: A New Approach to Aversion Therapy,"
Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 38 (1972): 244-250.
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Greek dualistic notion that man is "mind" and "body." Even in
the more subtle form that mind interacts with or influences the
body, such thinking is misleading. The Greek model of man
begins with the erroneous basic premise that man is dualistic,
and then attempts to put him back together with the glue of a
"holistic'' philosophy. Unfortunately, many Christians have accepted this erroneous basic premise. As a result they often break
man down into a dichotomous or trichotomous being, consisting
of body and mind, or of body, mind, and soul. This is unnecessary
in the light of current knowledge.
A monistic viewpoint is, I believe, reflected in the NT as well
as OT. If one keeps in focus the fact that NT writers were trying
to communicate in a culture profoundly influenced by Hellenistic
thinking, their apparent references to a dualistic nature of man
can be seen to result from their use of language. The substantive
content of their writings is clearly consistent with a monistic view
of man.
For example, in using such terms as "flesh" and "spirit," Paul
was not using them in the dualistic Greek sense as a contrast
between man's lower passions and his reason, but rather he
was illustrating an ethical contrast. This is clearly articulated,
for example, by W. D. Stacey, who writes as follows:
From a superficial point of view, flesh and spirit are antithetical. In Greek thought, they represented the tangible and the
intangible, the base and the lofty, the contaminated and the pure,
the bound and the free. This contrast is fundamental in Platonism, Orphism, and Hellenistic thought generally. T o the Hebrew
mind, the contrast would not be so evident and would concern
different aspects of the one person. . . .
He [Paul] did not regard the flesh as separate from man as a
whole, and it is certain that he never discussed spirit as a substance. . . . Paul's contrast was between man as a human being
seeking to live a godless life, and man as a child of God seeking
fellowship with Him.
.
A constructive statement must begin by recalling the meaning
Paul gives to the two terms. Spirit stands for the divine life and
power as manifested to men. Its end is to bring men to God, to
give rise to virtues, and to impart eternal life. The flesh stands
for the weakness and frailty of man which entertains evil and so

..
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separates from God and leads to death. . . . T h e contrast between these two is not a metaphysical distinction?

Stacey quotes from J. A. T. Robinson that Paul "is not referring
to the conflict, familiar to Greek ethics, between man's reason
and his passions" and then goes on to add his own further comment that Paul rather is "being practical and ethical, in the true
Hebrew tradition. He is always thinking, either of his own
experience, or that of his converts."1°
In addition to exploring Paul's use of the words "flesh" and
"spirit," Stacey also analyzes how Paul used expressions such as
"soul," "bodyYy'"heart," "mind," "conscience," and "inward man."
After a thorough exploration of these various terms, Stacey
draws the following conclusions:
T h e Hebrew did not see man as a combination of contrasted
elements, but as a unity that might be seen under a number of
different aspects. Behind each aspect was the whole personality.
Platonism, Orphism, and the Greek view generally, provide the
opposite point of view. In this matter, Paul was in the Hebrew
tradition. Every word in Paul refers to the whole man. . . .
Man as a unity could have a hundred different aspects, and a
hundred different words to describe them. If some overlapped
and became confused, it was of no consequence. In any case,
each included all, so some confusion was inevitable. The one
fact that remained clear was that man, with all his diversity of
aspects, was an integral unity.ll

Without a clearly-articulated monistic philosophy of man, we
are likely to make false distinctions between "mind and matter,"
or between "thinking and doingyy;we are prone to assume that
"thoughts" occur in the isolated privacy of our craniums, and
that "thinking" is somehow less real than "doing." Thus, we are
likely to miss'the meaning of Christ's statement in Mt 5:28 that
to lust for a woman is to commit adultery already, because
what happens in our brain and other parts of our organism
when we "lusty' is similar to what would occur if we were to
engage overtly in the behavior about which we fantasize. There
W. D. Stacey, The Pauline View of M a n (New York, 1956), pp. 174-178.
Ibid., p. 178.
Ibid., pp. 222-223.

lo
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is research which clearly demonstrates this.12
A monistic philosophy emphasizes the idea that although we
can talk about man from either a theological or a physiological
perspective, one viewpoint is not more "real" than the other.
Terminology of either perspective could conceivably be used
in theological discussion itself, depending upon the particular
aspect of truth and reality on which we wish to focus.
Moreover, it may be well to point out that many of the false
dichotomies which arise in theological discussions are directly
related to the dualistic language we use in talking about man.
The "faith versus works" issue is a case in point. Faith is often
seen as being exercised in the arena of the mind. Thus there is
a kind of mystical, nonreal quality about it. Works, on the other
hand, are viewed as being carried out by the body, and hence
appear to be less mystical in nature. Therefore, when a thoroughgoing monistic view of man is espoused, the issue of faith versus
works is more likely to be seen in its unified sense: Faith is real
behavior, and works also are real behavioral acts. Those more
private behaviors which occur primarily in the brain, we are
likely to label as having to do with faith; those behaviors which
we observe overtly as skeletal movements, we are more likely
to label as works. Monistic philosophy sensitizes us to the fact
that we are not dealing with a dichotomy, but rather that we
are using different words as labels for equally "real" points of
a behavioral continuum.
5. Conclusion
I would suggest that a monistic view of man seems most consistent with current thinking in the behavioral sciences and with
the biblical viewpoint. Since man is tremendously complex,
many different theoretical perspectives and vocabularies are
utilized in describing him. Each system gives a partial picture
and focuses on different aspects. It is our language systems and
theories which create the illusion of man's being made up of
various "parts," but man himself is an integral unity.

"W. H. Masters and V. E. Johnson. Human Sexual Response

(Boston, 1966).

